Some scholars known as offensive realists claim that in the uncertainty of world politics, trust and cooperation between states is extremely unlikely. Others, such as defensive realists, claim that rational states are capable of finding ways to counteract the complications created by misperceptions and distrust, and to reduce uncertainty to levels where it no longer inhibits cooperation. In this paper, we construct a formal model to show how in some situations cooperation between states is indeed very unlikely: even in the presence of minor misperceptions, states fail to cooperate. We then ask whether diplomacy (modeled as cheap talk) is able to remedy the failure. We show that in many situations, allowing the countries to communicate prior to taking their actions does not enable them to cooperate.
security-seeking states away from cooperation. On the other hand, defensive realists like Glaser (1995) respond to the pessimism of offensive realists by questioning the strength of the connections between anarchy, uncertainty and cooperation. In particular, defensive realists claim that two security-seeking states should not find it difficult to cooperate if they recognize each other as security-seeking, and while uncertainty about a state's motivations can complicate matters, uncertainty alone does not imply the dire predictions of offensive realism (Glaser 1997) . 1 An important contribution to the security dilemma debate is a paper by Kydd (1997a) , which to our knowledge is the first formal treatment of incomplete information in the security dilemma. This paper laid the foundations for a book titled Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, in which Kydd (2005) argues that Bayesian game theory is wellsuited to analyze the problems of trust that are at the heart of the security dilemma. Kydd (2005) proposes a new theory, which he calls Bayesian realism, as an alternative to offensive and defensive realism. In Bayesian realism, states have different preferences for revising the status quo and the level of trust between them is variable, as opposed to offensive and defensive realism in which states are always security-seeking. Using a signaling framework, Kydd (2005) shows that trustworthy states are often able to separate themselves from untrustworthy ones; and, in a dynamic setting, he shows how rational states can use costly gestures to reduce distrust to manageable levels, even when it is very high to start.
In this paper, we build on Kydd's (2005) premise that problems of trust are at the heart of the security dilemma. However, our model of uncertainty and distrust in the security dilemma differs in several important ways from Kydd's (2005) model and other previous work. First, while Kydd (2005) analyzes situations with common knowledge of the fundamentals and uncertainty about countries' preferences, we focus explicitly on uncertainty about the strategic fundamentals. In our model, countries receive informative but noisy signals regarding the advantage of unilateral defection. Specifically, we consider a situation where there is some (small) uncertainty about whether the strategic situation is described by a Prisoner's Dilemma or by a Stag Hut. Previous theory, like Kydd's (2005) , has modeled situations like World War II, where revisionist Germany is dissatisfied with an arrangement that provides it power that is incommensurate with its material and military status. Our model, alternatively, is of the security dilemma as it arises in situations like World War I (see, e.g., Van Evera 1999, Ch. 7). Here, the relevant uncertainty is about the state of military technology, the relative benefits to offensive military action, and the incentives to reciprocate cooperation. Second, our model supports the argument of offensive realists that even when states know that they are each security-seeking, trust can be so low that cooperation becomes impossible. We show how two countries fail to cooperate even when each is certain that the other is trustworthy, and they are both certain that they are both certain that they are both trustworthy. One might wonder where the uncertainty enters our model if the countries can be this certain. We show that this uncertainty enters the model in the higher order beliefs of the countries: although a country may be certain that both countries are trustworthy, and certain that the other country is also certain of this, it may not be certain that the other country is certain that it is certain ... and so on, that both are trustworthy. 2 Rather than take this kind of higher order uncertainty literally, we view it as a metaphor for the deep fears, suspicions, and doubts that leaders have about how trustworthy their counterparts are, and how their counterparts may perceive their own perceptions of the strategic environment-exactly the kinds of fears and suspicions that lead offensive realists to question the possibility of cooperation in the anarchy of world politics. 3 A number of previous papers have made a point similar to some we make. For example, Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2009a) study the role of fear, and the evolution of conflict, in a dynamic model of defensive weapons procurement. In a related paper, Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2010) study a dynamic exit game with a noisy signal structure and show that there is an important link between strategic risk and the possibility of cooperation. 4 These authors build on the work of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , who introduced a perturbation that can be used to select equilibria in games with multiple equilibria. Our paper differs from these papers in important ways. 5 Most important of these is the fact 2 Here we think of trustworthy states as those whose best response to cooperation in a given strategic setting is to reciprocate cooperation.
3 Under this interpretation, our argument is somewhat related to Butterfield's (1951) irreducibility dilemma that argues that no leader can ever know what is in the mind of other leaders. 4 Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2009b) use similar methods to show how mutual fears may aggravate the effect of negative economic shocks on civil conflict intensity. 5 For one, our framework is tractable enough that we can generalize the argument of previous models to a broader class of games. Second, we implicitly show that the importance of risk-dominance in the Carlsson-van Damme approach is an artifact of symmetries built into their information structure, and that that our framework is tractable enough that we can study the effect cheap talk on the set of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, following Fearon (1995) and others, 6 we model diplomacy as cheap talk, and ask whether diplomacy can make cooperation possible when it would otherwise not be possible. The same question is also asked by Baliga and Sjöström (2004) , who analyze a security dilemma and show that cheap talk can increase the probability of cooperation when players are uncertain about the arming costs of their adversaries. of costly or costless signaling to achieve cooperation. 9 The only difference is that Jervis (1978) provided a preference ordering over outcomes for each matrix, while we consider parametric payoffs that satisfy his ordering.
Prisoner's Dilemma Stag Hunt Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumptions that W i > w i > 0 and a i , b i > 0 for both i = 1, 2. These assumptions guarantee that the left payoff matrix in Figure 1 is indeed a Prisoner's Dilemma, and the right matrix is a Stag Hunt, as they are labeled.
The state s is a realization of some distribution π over S ⊆ R. We assume that conditional on s, each country i receives a private signal x i ∈ R drawn from a distribution
, as the information structure. Given the information structure, the set of possible signals for country i is X i = s∈S suppG i (·|s), and a pure strategy for country i is a function α i : X i → {C, D}.
We now make some assumptions about the information structure. Given the information structure, let H i (·|x i ) denote player i's posterior distribution over the state (updated by Bayes rule), conditional on receiving signal x i . Also, let F i (·|x i ) denote country i's posterior distribution over the possible signals received by the other country −i (again, updated by Bayes rule), conditional on receiving signal x i . Then, we assume
Part (i) of the assumption states that if a country receives a small enough signal, then it is certain (believes with probability 1) that it is playing the Prisoner's Dilemma in the left matrix of Figure 1 . Part (ii) states that if a country i receives a high signal, believing that the payoffs are given by the Stag Hunt, then it believes that the other country's signal is lower than its signal with probability larger than b i /(w i + b i ). This technical assumption implies the substantive assumption that defecting is not too "risky." If country i conjectured that its opponent plays a strategy that prescribes defection for signals smaller than its own, then country i would have a strict incentive to also defect.
Rather than describing a particular game, we have so far characterized a class of games G that we call security dilemma games. Holding fixed the players, i = 1, 2, their common action set, {C, D}, and the parameters, (
is fully described by its information structure (π, G 1 , G 2 ) satisfying assumption (A1). We now complete the description of some games that fall in the class G.
Examples
The games described below have different information structures, but all of them are security dilemma games satisfying assumption (A1).
Game Γ A . Suppose that the prior distribution of the state variable s is the improper uniform prior on R. 10 Country 1 observes the state perfectly, so it always receives the signal 
This is because for the game we have just described,
Note that (A2) implies that mutual defection is risk-dominant in the Stag Hunt of Figure 1 , but that (A1) itself does not contain any implicit assumption regarding risk-dominance.
Game Γ B . Again, suppose that the prior distribution of s is the improper uniform prior on R. However, this time assume that each country observes the state with some 10 The assumption of an improper prior is nonstandard, but poses no difficulties, since the players' interim beliefs are well-defined. (See, e.g., Morris and Shin 2003.) noise: conditional on the state s, each country receives a private signal independently drawn from the uniform distribution over [s − ξ, s + ξ] with ξ arbitrarily small. This implies that conditional on its signal x i , each country believes that s is distributed uniformly on
. Conditional on its signal x i , each country i believes that the other country's signal is distributed according to the tent-shaped density
Assumption (A1) is satisfied (again, with t = −ξ) if (A2) holds, for the same reason as in game Γ A .
Game Γ E . The state space is S = {−1, 0, 1, 2, ..., ∞}. The prior probability of state s ∈ S is given by 1 2 2+s . If the state is s, then each country i independently observes signal x i = s with probability q ∈ (0, 1), and signal x i = s + 1 with probability 1 − q. Therefore, conditional on signal x i , country i believes the state is x i with probability q 2−q and believes that the state is x i − 1 with complementary probability. Conditional on signal x i , country i believes that the other country's signal is x i − 1 with probability q 1 − q 2−q , x i + 1 with probability (1 − q) q 2−q and x i with remaining probability. Part (i) of assumption (A1) is satisfied with t = 0. For part (ii), we need
Since we can set b 1 and b 2 arbitrarily small, we can always find parameters such that this inequality holds.
In the game Γ A , a country with signal larger than ξ is certain that the payoffs are given by the Stag Hunt. A country with signal larger than 2ξ is certain that the other country is certain that the payoffs are given by the Stag Hunt. A country with signal larger than 3ξ is certain that the other country is certain that it is certain that the payoffs are given by the Stag Hunt. And so on. The games Γ B and Γ E have analogous belief structures, all of which are similar to Rubinstein's (1989) email game. Yet, we will show that cooperation is not possible in any equilibrium of any game in the class G.
Main Result
We now state and prove our main result: no matter how high the signals of the countries, and no matter how precise their observations of the state, there is no equilibrium of any security dilemma game in which any type of either country cooperates. Theorem 1. Every security dilemma game Γ ∈ G has a unique equilibrium in which all types of both countries defect.
Proof. First note that for every game Γ ∈ G, it is an equilibrium for all types of both countries to defect. To show that there are no other equilibria, suppose that there is an equilibrium in which a nonempty set of types C i ⊆ X i of some country i cooperate.
If C i = ∅ for some country i, then the number x * = inf C 1 ∪ C 2 exists, and by assumption (A1) we have x * ≥ t. In addition, either x * = inf C 1 or x * = inf C 2 , or both. Let j be any country such that x * = inf C j . Now, there are two possibilities: (i) x * ∈ C j and (ii) x * / ∈ C j .
Suppose x * ∈ C j and that country j receives signal x * . Given country −j's equilibrium strategy, let ϕ denote the probability with which country j believes that country −j will cooperate. Since x * ≥ t, assumption (A1) implies that country j believes that country −j's signal is smaller than x * with probability larger than b j /(w j + b j ). But, by definition of x * , all types of country −j below x * defect. So ϕ < w j /(w j + b j ). This implies that the expected payoff to country j from cooperating is
where the quantity on the right side of the inequality is country j's expected payoff from defecting. Therefore, we have shown that the type x * of country j can profitably deviate to defection: a contradiction.
Next, suppose that x * / ∈ C j . By construction, we can choose a typex > x * that is close enough to x * so thatx ∈ C j and the typex of country j believes with probability at most ϕ < w j /(w j + b j ) that country −j will cooperate. We can then use an argument similar to the one above to show that this type of country j could profitably deviate to defection:
again, a contradiction.
Reconstructing the Belief Structure
The logic of Theorem 1 can be explained by reconstructing the countries' beliefs associated with the information structure of a particular security dilemma game. Consider the game Γ A whose information structure was described in Section 2.1. Assume (A2) so that Γ A belongs to the class G, and for expositional purposes assume, in addition, that the payoffs are symmetric:
For country 1 to cooperate, it must believe with at least probability p = w/(w +b) > 1/2 that its opponent will also cooperate. Now, recall that a country that receives a signal smaller than −ξ must defect. Therefore, country 1 must believe that country −i's signal is larger than −ξ with probability at least p. In the terminology of Monderer and Samet (1989) country 1 must "p-believe" that country 2's signal is larger than −ξ. For this to be true, country 1's signal must be weakly larger than the threshold Now, observe that p-believing that country 2 received a signal larger than −ξ is only a necessary condition for country 1 to cooperate. It is not sufficient. In fact, we need country 1 to p-believe the following event as well:
country 2 p-believes that country 1's signal is larger than −ξ.
Otherwise, if country 2 does not p-believe that country 1's signal is larger than −ξ, then country 2 cannot be expected to cooperate. And if country 2 does not cooperate, then country 1 does not have an incentive to cooperate either. But then for country 2 to p-believe that country 1's signal is larger than −ξ, country 2's signal must be at least x 0 . Therefore, for country 1 to p-believe that country 2 p-believes that country 1's signal is larger than −ξ, country 1's signal must be weakly larger than the threshold
This threshold is calculated by finding the value of x 1 such that the length of the interval
Again, however, the conditions that country 1 p-believes that country 2's signal is larger than −ξ and p-believes that country 2 p-believes that country 1's signal is larger than −ξ are together still only necessary for country 1 to cooperate, not sufficient. Country 1 must also p-believe that country 2 p-believes that country 1 p-believes that country 2's signal is larger than −ξ. Otherwise, country 1 cannot expect country 2 to expect country 1 to cooperate, will therefore not expect country 2 to cooperate, and thus it will not be in country 1's interest to cooperate. In fact, for country i = 1, 2 to cooperate it must p-believe each of the following infinite sequence of events:
(0) −i's signal is larger than −ξ
(1) −i p-believes that i's signal is larger than −ξ (2) −i p-believes that i p-believes that −i's signal is larger than −ξ (3) −i p-believes that ...
(4) ... ad infinitum
Proceeding inductively, one can show that if country i p-believes the (0)th through (n)th one of these statements, its signal must be at least
Since ξ > 0 and p > 1/2, this quantity is unboundedly increasing in n. Consequently, there is no signal value for which country i p-believes every element of the infinite sequence of events listed above. As a result, there is no signal value for which country i cooperates.
Reconstructing the belief structure also enables us to clarify the importance of assumption A1(ii) in proving Theorem 1. This assumption guarantees that the sequence of thresholds x n is increasing and converges to +∞. For example, in the game Γ A , suppose that (A2) holds with reverse inequality so that A1(ii) is violated. Then p < 1/2, and the sequence of x n decreases, converging to −∞. Therefore, the iterative procedure above fails, and there may be equilibria in which the countries cooperate.
Cheap Talk Diplomacy
Theorem 1 above shows that without the opportunity to communicate, two countries playing a security dilemma game Γ ∈ G are incapable of cooperating in equilibrium. In this section we ask whether the opportunity to communicate enables cooperation.
Consider the following modification to a game Γ ∈ G. Suppose that after both countries observe their private signals, each is able to make a public announcement. Both countries can then make their decisions of whether or not to cooperate dependent on the pair of announcements. Let M i denote the nonempty set of available messages for country i. A pure strategy for country i is a pair (µ i , σ i ) such that µ i : X i → M is its message rule and To study the effect of cheap talk, we make the following assumption, which states that there are positive spillovers to cooperation in the Stag Hunt payoff matrix of Figure 1 :
Assumption (A5) implies that each country would always like the other country to cooperate regardless of whether it intends to do so itself. 12 Unfortunately, we are not able to provide general results that hold across all cheap talk extensions of games in G. Instead, we study various cheap-talk extensions to the games described in Section 2.1. We begin by proving our simplest result, which relies on an argument due to Baliga and Morris (1998). These authors showed that pre-play communication has no effect on the equilibrium outcome of Rubinstein's (1989) email game.
Not surprisingly, the same is true for the game Γ E , which is similar to the email game.
Proposition 1. Assume (A3) and (A5). Then, in every equilibrium outcome of every cheap
talk extensionΓ E ∈Ĝ(Γ E ), all types of both countries defect.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, that some type x i of either country i = 1, 2 cooperates in some equilibrium of a gameΓ E ∈Ĝ(Γ E ). Fix the equilibrium, and let x * j be the smallest type of either country that cooperates, with j denoting the country associated with this type. Let m * j be the equilibrium message sent by x * j , and let M * −j be the set of messages of the other country that induce x * j to cooperate. (In other words, σ j (m * j , m −j , x * j ) = C for all m −j ∈ M * −j = ∅.) Since it is strictly dominant for types −1 and 0 to defect, we must have x * j ≥ 1. Next, by assumption (A5), the type x * −j = x * j − 1 of country −j must send a message m * −j ∈ M * −j . But, by definition of x * j , the type x * −j = x * j − 1 of country −j chooses to defect. Therefore, conditional on receiving message m * −j , the type x * j believes that country −j will defect with probability weakly larger than q 1 − q 2−q > b j /(w j + b j ), 11 Note that this is a large class, since in describing a cheap talk extensionΓ, we have not specified the sets M1 and M2. For example, M1 could be finite while M2 is infinite, or they could both be finite, or one could be a singleton while the other one is infinite, etc.
12 Cheap talk extensions to Bayesian games with binary action positive spillovers were first studied by Baliga and Morris (2002) .
which holds by assumption (A3). Therefore, country j cannot cooperate after message profile (m * j , m * −j ), establishing the intended contradiction.
Proposition 1 shows that cheap talk is ineffective when added to the game Γ E . Does this result also hold for games Γ A and Γ B ? We do not provide a complete answer to this question, but our results below suggest that communication is difficult, if not impossible.
First, consider the case of one-sided messages. Let G(Γ ) denote the (sub)class of cheap talk extensions of the game Γ , = A, B, such that M 1 is finite and M 2 is a singleton. In these games, only player 1 has the opportunity to communicate, and may do so with a finite set of messages (which we allow to be arbitrarily large). The next proposition states that there are no equilibria in which communication takes place in any game in this class.
Proposition 2. Assume (A2) and (A5). Then, in every equilibrium outcome of every cheap talk extension Γ ∈ G(Γ ), = A, B, all types of both countries defect.
Proof. We prove this only for the case where = A. The case where = B is conceptually identical, but more tedious.
where λ(·) is Lesbegue measure. In words, this is the probability mass that type x of a country assigns to the event that the signal received by the other country falls in the set X, unconditional on the message profile. Observe that
Now, fix an equilibrium ((µ 1 , σ 1 ), (µ 2 , σ 2 )). Since M 2 is a singleton, we can set M 2 = {m 2 }, so that µ 2 (x) = m 2 for all x ∈ X 2 . Define the sets
These are the sets of country 1 types that send message m and respectively cooperate and defect. Also, define the set
This is the set of country 2 types that cooperate in some equilibrium outcome of the game.
Note that if C m 1 = ∅ for all m ∈ M 1 then C 2 = ∅. So to prove the result, it suffices to show that C m 1 = ∅ for all m ∈ M 1 . To that end, suppose for the sake of contradiction that C m 1 = ∅ for some m ∈ M 1 and let x * 1 = inf m∈M 1 C m 1 . Then, C 2 = ∅, so we can define x * 2 = inf C 2 . We know that x * 1 , x * 2 ≥ −ξ. The contradiction is then established in three steps.
Step 1.
1 , all country 1 types in the interval [x 2 − ξ, x 2 + ξ] defect. Therefore, the type x 1 cannot exist, and we must have
But by definition of x * 2 , the type x 1 of country 1 believes with probability at most
Step
= m} be the set of messages sent by country 1 types between x * 1 −ξ and
(The hypothesis is that the type x m exists for each m ∈ M * 1 .) Then, because the type x m , m ∈ M * 1 , cooperates after seeing message m from country 1, we must have
Summing over m ∈ M * 1 , and rearranging, we get
Also, note that by definition of M * 1 , and because [
Combining this with (9) , and the fact that p 2 > 1 2 , we arrive at
However, notice that we must have
The second inequality holds because C m 1 ⊆ [x * 1 , ∞) for all m ∈ M * 1 , by definition of x * 1 . The equality holds because {C m 1 } m∈M 1 is by definition a collection of mutually disjoint sets. The first inequality holds by the property in (5), since x m ≤ x * 1 for all m ∈ M * 1 . But then (11) and (12) contradict each other.
Step 3. The typex (from Step 2) of country 1 has a profitable deviation.
where ε is small, i.e. 0 < ε < ξ(2p 1 − 1).
, the fact that ε is small implies that there is a type
by definition of typex. However, observe that by sending messagem typex of country 1 can expect country 2 to cooperate with probability at most
But by deviating to the message m 1 , typex of country 1 can expect country 2 to cooperate with probability at least
So the typex of country 1 can expect a country 2 to cooperate with strictly larger probability after sending message m 1 than after sending messagem. Therefore, by (A5), it is profitable for the country 1 typex to deviate to message m 1 .
As we mentioned in the introduction, Example 2 in Baliga and Morris (2002) Proof. We prove this only for = A. (Again, the case = B is conceptually identical, but more tedious.) So fix a gameΓ A ∈G(Γ A ), and let
We show that if b i < b i , i = 1, 2, then conditional on any state s, both countries defect with probability 1 in every equilibrium of the gameΓ A . Note that if b i < b i , i = 1, 2, where b i is given by (11) , then both (A2) and (A5) are satisfied. Now, fix an equilibrium, and for each i = 1, 2, define the set
Assume for the sake of contradiction that C i = ∅ for some i = 1, 2. Let x * = inf C 1 ∪ C 2 , and note that x * ≥ −ξ. Let j be any country for which x * = inf C j . Fix ε > 0 small and consider a typex j ∈ [x * , x * + ε) ∩ C j . Let m −j ∈ M −j denote the message such that
Then, there must be a typex j ∈ C j such that
and σ j (µ j (x j ), m −j ,x j ) = C, where m −j = m −j . Otherwise, by (A5), all country −j types in the interval x j − ξ, x * + ε + 2ξ b j w j +b j − ξ would send message m −j . Therefore, conditional on message profile (µ j (x j ), m −j ), the typex j would believe that country −j will defect with at least probability
and therefore would choose to defect after the message profile (µ j (x j ), m −j ), a contradiction. Now, because each country has only two messages, there are two cases: (i) at least a measure ξ/2 of country −j types in the interval [x * − ξ, x * ] send message m −j , or (ii) at least a measure ξ/2 of country −j types in the interval [x * − ξ, x * ] send message m −j . In case (i), conditional on message profile (µ j (x j ), m −j ) the typex j believes that country −j defects with probability at least 1 2ξ
In case (ii), conditional on message profile (µ j (x j ), m −j ), the typex j believes that country −j will defect with probability at least 1 2ξ
If b j < w j /7 then we can choose ε small enough that the probability thresholds in (19) and (20) are both strictly larger than b j /(w j + b j ), which establishes the intended contradiction.
This means that we must have C 1 = C 2 = ∅. Thus, conditional on any state s, both countries defect with probability 1. 
Final Remarks
Our results support the logical validity of offensive realism as a paradigm of world politics, and they demonstrate its consistency with a rational theory of international cooperation.
However, it would be a mistake to interpret our results as providing an unqualified endorsement of offensive realism. This is because our model is silent about when assumptions (A1) and (A5) are accurate descriptions of real-life situations. For example, as we suggested in the introduction, our assumptions are consistent with the situation that precipitated World War I but not with the situation that precipitated World War II. An explanation for when the World War I situation arises is an important question for research, but is outside the scope of our paper. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that if assumption (A1)(ii) is violated then mutual cooperation is an equilibrium outcome. 13 Similarly, if assumption (A1)
is satisfied but (A5) is violated, then cheap talk enables cooperation in some games where 13 Suppose for concreteness that (wi, Wi, ai, bi) = (4, 12, 4, 8) , i = 1, 2 and the information structure is
given by the game Γ B . Here (A2) is violated so mutual cooperation is risk dominant. Then, it is easy to verify that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all types (weakly) above (1 + 2/ √ 3)ξ cooperate and all types below this threshold defect. it would otherwise not be possible. 14 These observations are hardly surprising given the existing literature. Having said that, it is difficult to make sense of a violation of assumption (A5) in our context: If (A5) does not hold, then a defecting country would (weakly) gain from its opponent defecting rather than cooperating. (So while it is plausible that assumption (A1) might not be empirically descriptive, it is less plausible that assumption (A5) is violated.) Finally, our paper leaves many questions unanswered. First, we narrowly focused our attention on costless signaling because we were interested in studying the effectiveness show that more work is required to achieve a general understanding of the effect of cheap talk in games of incomplete information.
14 Suppose for concreteness that (wi, Wi, ai, bi) = (8, 12, 4, 5) , i = 1, 2 and the information structure is given by the game Γ B . Here, (A2) is satisfied so mutual defection is the only equilibrium outcome. However, in the cheap talk extension Γ B ∈ G(Γ B ) in which country 1 can send one of a finite number of messages, mutual cooperation is an equilibrium outcome. In fact, let κ1 = 1 − 2 √ 30/9 and κ2 = 2 √ 6/3 − (1 + 2 √ 30/9). Then, it is easy to verify that the following is an equilibrium to this game: (i) all country 1 types (weakly) above κ1ξ send message m and cooperate, and all other types send message m = m and defect, and (ii) all country 2 types (weakly) above κ2ξ cooperate if and only if the message is m, and all other types defect after every message.
